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Introduction and overview 
This special issue presents an excellent opportunity to study applied epistemology 
in public policy. This is an important task because the arena of public policy is the social 
domain in which macro conditions for ‘knowledge work’ and ‘knowledge industries’ are 
defined and created. We argue that knowledge-related public policy has become overly 
concerned with creating the politico-economic parameters for the commodification of 
knowledge. Our policy scope is broader than that of Fuller (1988), who emphasises the 
need for a social epistemology of science policy. We extend our focus to a range of 
policy documents that include communications, science, education and innovation policy 
(collectively called knowledge-related public policy in acknowledgement of the fact that 
there is no defined policy silo called ‘knowledge policy’), all of which are central to 
policy concerned with the ‘knowledge economy’ (Rooney and Mandeville 1998). 
However, what we will show here is that, as Fuller (1995) argues, ‘knowledge societies’ 
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 3 
are not industrial societies permeated by knowledge, but that knowledge societies are 
permeated by industrial values.  
Our analysis is informed by an autopoietic perspective. Methodologically, we 
approach it from a sociolinguistic position that acknowledges the centrality of language 
to human societies (Graham 1999 2000). Here, what we call ‘knowledge’ is posited as a 
social and cognitive relationship between persons operating on and within multiple social 
and non-social (or, crudely, ‘physical’) environments. Moreover, knowing, we argue, is a 
sociolinguistically constituted process. Further, we emphasise that the evaluative 
dimension of language is most salient for analysing contemporary policy discourses 
about the commercialisation of epistemology (Graham, under review). 
Finally, we provide a discourse analysis of a sample of exemplary texts drawn 
from a 1.3 million-word corpus of knowledge-related public policy documents which we 
compiled from local, state, national, and supranational legislatures throughout the 
industrialised world. Our analysis exemplifies a propensity in policy for resorting to 
technocratic, instrumentalist, and anti-intellectual views of knowledge in policy. We 
argue that what underpins these patterns is a commodity-based conceptualisation of 
knowledge, which is underpinned by an axiology of narrowly economic imperatives that 
is at odds with the very nature of knowledge. The commodity view of knowledge, 
therefore, is flawed in its ignorance of the social systemic properties of ‘knowing’. 
Knowledge versus knowing: some distinctions between ‘things’ and ‘processes’ 
Our perspective stresses the close link between knowledge, and language, or more 
precisely, ways of knowing, and ways of representing (cf. Fairclough 2000; Lemke 1995, 
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pp. 40-43). More importantly, we emphasise the link between expert, or knowledgeable, 
language and the evaluative biases of ‘its’ social context of production. Our framework is 
based on the assumption that ‘knowledge’ is socially produced and situated; that it is 
relational, processual, and social-systemic. Indeed, what we call ‘knowledge’ constitutes 
the autopoiesis—the self-producing and reproducing processes—of human social systems 
(Graham and McKenna 2000, p. 41). Autopoiesis is ‘necessary and sufficient to 
characterize the organization of living systems’ (Maturana and Varela 1980, p. xviii). 
Because we assume that human social systems are living systems, we therefore assume 
that they are necessarily knowing (cognitive) systems. Hence we also assume that human 
knowing is a continuous and dynamic social process rather than a static objective 
substance, and that the process of knowing is a ‘third-order’, ‘sociocognitive’, autopoietic 
process constituted in the consensual domains of language (Graham and McKenna, 2000; 
Maturana and Varela, 1980, 1987).3   
Such a view suggests that social epistemology should not only be concerned with 
the semantic ‘content’ of knowledge, but also, and more importantly, the knowledge 
environment, with its networks of social relations, cultural and physical environments, 
and domain-specific practices. Put differently, we are arguing for a shift in focus from an 
epistemology oriented towards what might ‘count’ as knowledge (semantically, a 
‘substance’ or ‘thing’ that can be readily and substantially quantified and commodified) 
to one that is concerned with how knowledge and its perceived legitimacy are 
continuously produced (a process) socially (a cluster of phenomena that may or may not 
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be suitable for commodification). This requires, in Fuller’s (1999) terms, a shift ‘from 
content to context’ in conceptually ‘locating’ social epistemology (p. 97). In terms of 
policy, this requires us to do more than put in place processes and institutions to vet 
‘knowledge’, as Fuller (1988, pp. 289-94) has suggested. Rather, we need to focus more 
explicitly upon institutional processes of legitimation: normative social work that endows 
specifically positioned agents with the legitimacy of ‘knowledge specialists’; people who 
are ‘disproportionately empowered to cultivate, negotiate, calibrate, and disseminate 
knowledges of social relations, cultural meanings, national identities and other idioms of 
social differentiation’ (Boyer 2000, p. 4). Therefore, the ‘knowledge specialists’ of the 
public policy communities are an especially paradoxical focus for any study of social 
epistemology because they constitute the social domains within which knowledge-related 
policy is produced, and within which the very nature of legitimate, ‘commercially viable’ 
knowledge is defined.  
To reiterate and clarify: our perspective is underpinned by an understanding of 
social systems as living systems in which, from a third-order autopoietic perspective, 
knowing is understood as a sociocognitive process; and the systemic unit of analysis for 
self-organising processes in human societies is the meta-organismic ‘discourse 
community’ (Lemke, 1995).4 Thus we consider knowledge, language, history, context, 
and social coherence to be inseparable in the constitution of human social phenomena.   
                                                 
4 Although that is a contentious view by some accounts, (e.g. Mingers 1996, p. 470; Whittaker 1998), for 
our purposes it has been sufficiently theorised and defended elsewhere (e.g. Graham and McKenna, 2000; 
Luhmann 1995).  
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The social sciences, managerialism, technocratic discourse, and knowledge policy 
The technocratic response to the most recent challenges in the realm of human 
interrelatedness appears to be to conceptually reduce the inherent complexity of human 
creative processes to the absolute minimum in order to make ‘sense’ of social 
disjunctions (McKenna 2000). We define technocrats as people who transform 
‘discourses of expert knowledge into discourses of social policy’ (Lemke 1995, p. 58). 
They are the ‘makers of politics and purveyors of mass information’ (Marcuse 1968, p. 
28), the ‘catalysts of the Third Industrial Revolution and the ones responsible for keeping 
the high-tech economy running’ (Rifkin 1995, p. 175). In Saul’s (1992, 1997) view, 
contemporary technocrats are informed by managerialist values, reifed and hardened by 
years of development within massified and increasingly centralised industrial societies.  
The simplistic, pseudo-scientific posturing of technocracy typifies the discourse 
traditions of so-called ‘rational’ management (and rationalism in general), both in 
business and, importantly for our purposes here, in public policy:  
The creation of contemporary government elites has followed the same course as that of 
the new business elites. The phenomenon has different superficial characteristics, but the 
underlying theme is identical … [T]he trend began with the growth of the social sciences, 
which forced the full array of real social questions into a falsely scientific straightjacket. 
The postwar schools of political science and economics are a prime example, with their 
reliance on abstract models, flowcharts, and impenetrable specialist dialects. Apart from 
being indescribably boring, they have been almost flawlessly wrong on every issue they 
have addressed (Saul 1992, p. 123). 
However closely our views align with those expressed in the above quote by Saul, we do 
not, indeed cannot, reject technique and technicality. Indeed, we must resort to technique 
and technology to write this article. We do, though, reject the tendencies of technocracy 
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to both elide and render invisible world-views and value systems that fall outside the 
auspices of social control and narrowly economistic ‘outcomes’ (McKenna 2000).   
For us, there is a clear imperative to critically analyse the tendencies of 
technocratic discourses that demand the constituents of complex socio-cultural systems to 
‘simply align’ themselves with the ‘values, visions, and practices’ of managerialist value 
systems — including the assumption that knowledge only has value in relation to its 
amenability to being commodified (Gee and Lankshear 1995, p. 10). We reject the notion 
that such value systems are the only ones within which policy authors can think about the 
development of any future knowledge society (Graham and McKenna 2000). In the 
following two sections, we outline why technocratic axiologies have come to dominate 
the domains of public policy; how such value systems render the social universe as an 
object of instrumental outcomes; and why, perhaps, the self-imposed (autopoietically 
constituted) constraints of the policy discourse community remain an obstacle to realising 
the potential of alternative axiologies. 
Language, ‘thingness’, and the technicalisation of epistemology  
When considering the domain of public policy, the commodification of 
epistemology becomes even more problematic when one considers the historical 
tendencies of scientific and technical languages in general. Technical languages, by 
necessity freeze processes, rendering them to the grammatical status of ‘things’. For 
instance, when metal is exposed to air, it oxidises. The process is known as oxidation. 
This is what Halliday calls the ‘thingness’ of technical language (Halliday, 1993, p. 11). 
Social processes, once nominalised by social science, are also often treated as ‘things’, as 
if they existed independently of people and society (McKenna 2000). They can then be 
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hurled about, willy nilly, in the transit system of language, as agents, circumstances, or 
various other sorts of ‘things’ (Martin 1999). That tendency makes for considerable 
confusion, because instead of remaining part of a flexible system of thought, nominalised 
social processes tend to become perceived as ‘things’ that stand in relation only to one or 
more established taxonomies of ‘thingified’ conceptual entities (McKenna and Graham, 
2000). Often throughout history, such concepts—via legislation and coercion—are given 
power over people (Graham 2000). At that point, they take their place as active 
participants in the social order, much like conceptions of God which, once given 
sufficient definition, normative inculcation, and legal sanction, become bases of, and 
rationales for, decision making in technocratic discourse communities. 
That tendency is especially problematic in the social sciences (including and 
perhaps especially in public policy). It leads to a confusion between ‘things’ that people 
do, ‘things’ that people think and say, ‘things’ that people have, and the myriad other 
‘things’ that exist external to people (including other people and other groups of people!). 
Technocratic discourse, in particular, tends to manipulate objectified social processes, 
consequently collapsing consensual domains and myriad social processes in a potpourri 
of pseudo-objects and self-validating taxonomies (Halliday 1993; Halliday and Martin 
1993b; McKenna and Graham 2000). Technocratic discourses, we argue, collapse 
consensual domains to create simplistic models of ‘what knowledge is’, precisely at the 
cost of comprehending ‘how knowledge is produced, validated, and evaluated’. This is, in 
some respects, a function of the contemporary view of theory, which ‘stems from an 
artificial separation of methodology from philosophy’ (Harvey 1973, p. 11).  
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From this separation flows a tendency to regard facts as separate from values, objects as 
independent of subjects, “things” as possessing an identity independent of human 
perception and action, and the “private” process of discovery as separate from the 
“public” process of communicating the result. (pp. 11-12) 
Here, in Harvey’s critique of artificial disjunctions between fact and value, object and 
subject, philosophy and method—between the language of things and the language of 
processes—lies the rationale for our evaluatively based perspective upon applied, social 
epistemology. 
A further (and empirically verifiable) phenomenon informing our approach is 
that, within discourse communities, ‘thematic patterns … recur from text to text in 
slightly different wordings, but [are] recognisably the same, and can be mapped onto a 
generic semantic pattern that is the same for all’ texts about particular topics (Lemke 
1995, p. 42). The same holds for ‘evaluative patterns’ (Graham under review). An 
evaluative-analytical approach, then, provides us with a useful tool for understanding the 
organising value constructs which inform the conceptual apparatuses of the policy 
discourse community (Lemke 1995, pp. 99-105). In taking this analytical approach, we 
can uncover recurrent evaluative patterns within the public policy discourse community 
of ‘what it means to know’. 
Implications of technocratic evaluative stances towards knowledge  
It is worth speculating about what happens when understandings of knowledge in 
public policy are at odds with the actual underlying dynamics of knowing, as seen, for 
example, in the difference between mechanistic and autopoietic understandings. We 
argue that a seriously ineffective knowledge-related public policy framework has 
emerged because (1) the phenomenological system it seeks to organise is misunderstood, 
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and (2) such misunderstandings cause a serious overestimation of the degree to which 
phenomenological systems like ‘knowledge economies’ can reasonably be subjected to 
commercialisation or commodification while still maintaining their function as the source 
of social coherence. We argue that this last occurs because of the extent to which the 
autopoietic processes of any discourse community are impeded or destroyed through the 
system being understood and ‘treated’ as an entirely instrumental and alien constitution 
of activities and ‘objects’ destined for private ownership in the pursuit of profit, rather 
than as a process of ongoing social cognition and, consequently, coherence.  
Evaluative patterns in knowledge-related public policy: Some analytical notes 
Our analytical framework seeks, again, not to separate facts from values, but 
rather to treat them as inseparable aspects of meaning. It is a slightly modified version of 
a method developed by Lemke, which is organised around a set of ‘semantic classes [or 
dimensions] of evaluative attributes for propositions and proposals, which appear to be 
the only ones allowed in English’ (Lemke 1998, p. 36):  
Evaluative Dimension Positive degree Negative degree 
[D] Desirability/Inclination It is wonderful that John is coming It is horrible that John is coming 
[W] Warrantability/Probability It is certain that John is coming It is unlikely that John will come 
[N] Normativity/Appropriateness It is essential that John comes It is inappropriate that John comes 
[U] Usuality/Expectability It is normal that John is coming It is unusual that John is coming 
[I] Importance/Significance It is important that John comes It is irrelevant whether John comes 
[C] Comprehensibility/Obviousness It is obvious that John will come It is mysterious that John is coming 
[H] Humourousness/Seriousness It is hilarious that John will be there It is serious that John is coming 
[A] Ability/Difficulty [proposals] It is easy for John to come It is difficult for John to come 
[Ut] Utility/Usefulness [proposals] It is useful for John to come It is useless for John to come 
Figure 1: Evaluative resources for proposals and propositions (adapted from Lemke, 1998, p. 37) 
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The rank-shifted semantic ‘probe’ for evaluated propositions and proposals is: ‘it is 
(degree) X that …’ for propositions, or, ‘it is (degree) to …’ for proposals. If condensed 
evaluative attributes are reframed in the form of ‘[It is X that …] where that introduces an 
embedded noun clause, and the extraposed it is is followed by an adjective’ then these 
adjectives ‘fall into a very small number of semantic classes, all of which are in some 
sense evaluative epithets’ (Lemke 1998, p. 37). This form can also contain evaluative 
modalisers that alter the Degree of the evaluative dimension. Examples from the corpus 
are: ‘it is (very) difficult to arrange for the transfer of the most sophisticated skills to 
these companies (noieconv: 10302)’ (a proposal evaluated for a high Degree of negative-
Ability); and, ‘it is (very) important that the supply from the future work-force—i.e. 
those currently in education—will in the longer term lead to a reduction of the ICT 
manpower shortage (hollan~2: 15,801)’ (a proposition evaluated for a high Degree of 
Importance/Significance). Importantly, evaluative patterns with these particular structures 
can become condensed over time, much in the manner of thematic condensation (e.g. 
nominalisations), so that a single attribution in a proposition can ‘collapse’ the full rank-
shifted form into a single word (Graham under review; Lemke 1998, p. 36). For example, 
‘John is a terrorist’, because of normative evaluative inculcation, can easily be expanded 
into the form ‘It is (very) un-Desirable and in-Appropriate that John is a terrorist’ (a 
proposition evaluated for a high negative Degree of Desirability). That is the 
phenomenon of ‘evaluative condensation’. 
Within the ‘systemic functional’ tradition, from which we draw many of our 
discourse-analytical tools, the difference between ‘propositions’ and ‘proposals’ is that 
propositions (broadly, descriptions of some phenomenon, past, present, or future) can be 
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tested for truth (which is only one Dimension of evaluation), whereas proposals (such as 
requests or demands for action) cannot (Halliday 1994, pp. 68-71). However, here we 
adopt a modified distinction between propositions and proposals put forward by Thibault 
(in press) which is defined with an emphasis on the attitudinal (or evaluative, or 
axiological), rather than purely semantic (logical and experiential), dimensions of 
language. This allows for a ‘propositional attitude’ (an attitudinal claim about the truth of 
something) to be expressed about a ‘something’ that cannot immediately be tested for 
truth, such as an arguable claim regarding ‘a possible future state of affairs’.  
The role of policy is to ‘get people to do things’ (Muntigl in press, p. 147), which 
includes ways of knowing. Thibault’s (in press) definition of proposals and propositions 
is, therefore, especially useful for the analysis of knowledge-related policy discourse 
because of policy’s necessarily future-oriented, hortatory function (there is no point 
trying ‘to get people to do things’ in the past). There is also strong generic (normative) 
institutional pressure in contemporary policy institutions to translate (more or less) 
opaquely statements of ‘fact’ into imperatives for action, thereby causing technocratic 
authors to invoke (sometimes extremely subtle) forms of the naturalistic fallacy. This is a 
largely implicit function of contemporary policy discourses, which draw largely on 
technocratic value systems (McKenna 2000). Addressees of policy texts are implicitly 
expected to respond with specific actions, based on normatively inculcated axiologies, to 
what are ostensibly statements of ‘fact’ (Graham under review). Unlike the Regents of 
the ancien régime, the modern technocrat cannot merely command his or her subjects to 
act in such and such a way; they must convince addressees of ‘the facts of the matter’, 
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and Necessary actions can thus be ‘recommended’ as a natural corollary. So when a 
policy expert writes that 
Encouraging links between cultural institutions, cultural workers and commercial content 
producers will help to increase the variety and quality of digital content, and improve 
Australia's visibility in the global online environment. (cita: 3,835). 
The reader is expected to infer the Desirability of increasing the variety and quality of 
digital content and improving Australia’s visibility in the global online environment, 
therefore accepting the Necessity of linking cultural institutions, cultural workers and 
commercial content producers (i.e. commercialising ‘culture’, a third-order processual 
‘artefact’ which exists independently of any specific individuals). In other words, the 
desired result of such a statement is a metaphorical transfer between the proposition that 
‘doing X will achieve Y’ (commercialising cultural production will improve digital 
variety and online visibility)—a truth claim—and the proposal, the exhortation, to ‘Do 
X!’ (commercialise culture!). The metaphorical displacement is based on an expected 
evaluation of Desirability among addressees for very vague outcomes, none of which 
should necessarily lead us to perceive them as intrinsically Desirable. The metaphorical 
displacement between two very different types of language—the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’; the 
proposition and the proposal (exhortation)—takes place, therefore, largely in the realm of 
axiological meaning, rather than in logical and experiential dimensions.  
 Since policy is oriented towards modifying future behaviour, it is oriented 
towards emphasising the Necessity of specific kinds of action sometime in the future 
(Graham in press; Muntigl in press). Imperatives for Necessary action are also realised in 
the semantics of Importance, which, when directed towards action or behaviour, are 
operationalised as (or oriented towards) the semantics of Necessity (Lemke 1998; 
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Thibault in press). Therefore, to draw out the evaluative patterns that are overtly intrinsic 
to the hortatory function of the policy corpus, we probed the corpus for four-word 
clusters around the semantic dimensions of Importance and Necessity (‘it is important to’; 
‘it is necessary to’; ‘there is a need for/to’; and so on). These clusters most overtly 
explicate what policy makers evaluate as being Necessary kinds of action to bring about 
benefits for their constituencies from knowledge-related policy.  
The evidence we present clearly shows that a recurring axiological preference for 
a strong instrumentalist, technocratic axiology underpins knowledge-related public 
policy; that non instrumental aspects of life are not seen to be of concern to policy 
makers, except in relation to how these aspects might realise economic values (which the 
discourse generally equates with price); and that the aspects most likely to be targeted for 
commodification are intrinsic to, or entirely contingent upon, third-order autopoiesis—
precisely the aspects of human activity that define human social systems as such, and 
which is the organising principle of social coherence (Graham and McKenna 2000). 
Third-order processes are to the (living) social system what the genetic code is to the 
individual organism: the very ‘essence of life’ (Barlow 1998). What is being proposed in 
contemporary ‘knowledge economy’ policy, then, is the commodification of everything 
human—the commodification of essential life-processes (Graham 2000). 
Analysis 
The texts we have included here exemplify our analytical findings, but are by no 
means exhaustive. Using Wordsmith Tools software, our test for overt semantic markers 
of Necessity and Importance returned 16, 901 examples, far too many to include here. 
The analysis is a representative sample from that sub-corpus which shows the tendencies 
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we have described above most overtly. Those tendencies are present to greater and lesser 
degrees in every instance returned by our search. 
The first example is from South Africa. This document is the least overtly 
instrumental text we were able to identify in the corpus. In this respect, it acts as 
something of a reference point for the rest of the analysis. Semantic markers (evaluators) 
for Necessity and Importance are marked in bold; sociocognitive (third-order autopoietic) 
processes which are construed as the ‘objects’ of policy (that which is to be modified and 
commodified) are marked in italics; Degree modifiers are marked in (round brackets); 
references to ‘utilitarian’ or ‘instrumental’ outcomes are [enclosed in square brackets]; 
and other evaluative dimensions, as defined in fig. 1 (above), condensed or otherwise, are 
underlined. Texts are numbered, and referenced by corpus file names and word numbers. 
[1] World-wide there is a clear trend for curiosity-driven research to increase as a function 
of [national per capita income]. Nevertheless, there is a danger of adopting [too 
economistic a viewpoint]. Even at our current stage of development, there is a need to 
recognise the importance of the knowledge-generating function of research, particularly 
in the higher education sector. Human wonder and curiosity and the ability to recognise 
serendipitous discovery account for much of [scientific progress]. Basic enquiry, as 
opposed to a formula-driven approach, is (absolutely) essential, particularly at the 
universities and technikons, which deal with young minds. It is important that 
fundamental research activity not be regarded as impractical, because it is the preserver 
of standards without which, in the long term, the [applied sciences] will also die. Scientific 
endeavour is not purely utilitarian in its [objectives] and has important associated cultural 
and social values. It is also important to maintain [a basic competence in "flagship" 
sciences such as physics and astronomy] for cultural reasons. (sthafr~1: 5,230) 
Here we see what could be regarded as an attempt to balance humanistic and instrumental 
(technocratic) value-systems. Importance and Necessity evaluatively link the knowledge-
generating function of research, higher education, human wonder and curiosity, and 
fundamental research activity to implicitly exhort addressees to perceive research as an 
ultimately ‘instrumental’ pursuit, precisely by saying that such aspects of human activity 
should not be regarded as impractical. At the risk of perhaps being overly critical, this is 
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not a position that says non-instrumental pursuits can exist legitimately as a concern for 
government without reference to overly economistic concerns, even though it hints at the 
potentially destructive effects of entirely commodifying second- and third-order 
autopoietic phenomena. There is an underpinning and overarching concern for scientific 
progress and applied science (and by extension industrial and material ‘progress’) that 
subsumes the humanistic aspects of the text under the neoliberal, technocratic aegis of 
‘economic growth’. 
A more typical set of constructs deployed in attempts to foreground non-
instrumental aspects of social life is illustrated in an Australian document: 
While digitisation of our existing cultural and artistic works is a critical area of activity, 
there is a need to recognise that Australian artists and cultural workers are currently 
challenging and pushing the boundaries of online technologies to invent [completely new 
works]. These activities need to be encouraged and supported - for example, the US firm 
Intel is funding online artists as [a research and development exercise, a way of testing 
the capabilities of its products]. Artists need to be recognised as [innovative contributors 
to the information economy]. [Encouraging links between cultural institutions, cultural 
workers and commercial content producers] will help to increase the variety and quality of 
digital content, and improve Australia's visibility in the global online environment. Access 
to affordable high bandwidth will assist cultural workers [to use interactive technologies to 
produce Australian cultural content that is innovative, challenging and engaging]. (cita1: 
3,385) 
Here we see, not just an explicit legitimation of art as a precursor to industrial and 
commercial innovation, and as a producer of ‘products’ (rather than for any intrinsic 
social value), but we also see an exhortation for the Necessity of construing art as a 
technologically dependent endeavour which is best ‘used’ to produce digital content, a 
research and development exercise, and a way of testing the capabilities of technological 
products. We do not decry the commercial and industrial links to art, or the role of 
technology in its production. We simply point out further evidence of the narrow sense of 
legitimate rationales for the existence of essentially non instrumental activities in 
knowledge-related policy domains. In this case, the corporatisation and technologisation 
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of art is operationalised as an unmitigatedly Necessary and unproblematic objective, to 
the extent that one cannot help but question the wisdom of this pattern of evaluative 
assumptions in a truly knowledge-based society. 
A more extreme example of the instrumentalisation of culture is seen in another 
Australian document, one that is also typical of many in the corpus. It advocates the: 
Digitisation of national heritage collections is being facilitated through Australia's Cultural 
Network… There is also a need for cultural institutions to identify [intellectual property 
issues] and [develop protocols to deal with them].  
It is important to encourage best practice standards for [inter-networked cultural 
databases and collection management systems]. There are also opportunities for new 
collaborative partnerships between cultural organisations, government and private 
enterprise to produce [quality, market-oriented products and services]. (noie1: 9,475) 
National heritage collections, cultural institutions, intellectual property, best practice 
standards, protocols, databases, collection management systems, and market-oriented 
products and services (an unlikely set of discursive bedfellows) are seamlessly and 
unapologetically conflated as both Necessary and Desirable aspects in the (flagrantly 
nationalistic) commodification of third-order phenomena (opportunities are always 
Desirable potential future states for someone).  
We must also question what might constitute best practice in art, which one assumes is 
primarily concerned with new and challenging creative outcomes, and which is in any 
cased appraised from entirely subjective and culturally-specific aesthetics constructs. It is 
also difficult to avoid commenting on the capitalising of the term Cultural Network, thus 
transforming ‘it’ into a proper noun, a nominalised ‘thing’, no doubt, a technological 
infrastructure, which is best ‘managed’ by networked cultural databases. The same 
document continues to express its authors’ technocratic concerns that government ensures 
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the integrity and growth of Australian culture in the global information economy when 
they state that: 
The government sees [the information economy] as a chance to enrich the lives of 
Australians and the wider global community by promoting access to Australia's cultural 
collections, activities and events. [Online technologies] make possible new forms of 
cultural expression, and also make it possible to reach new audiences, at home and 
overseas, with [Australian cultural products]. In the digital environment, there is a need 
to ensure that the creative work of Australians is protected against manipulation and 
theft. (noie1: 9,225) 
Here is a restatement of the cultural heritage-products-technologies link already 
expressed. But the authors go on to imply that integration with market mechanisms is 
imperative by relating new audiences to the need for legal protection (from manipulation 
and theft). The needs expressed are explicitly economic and legalistic rather than 
creative; they are to do with objective property (things) rather than subjective and socio-
cultural aesthetics, and more importantly, creative processes. We ask: what is the cultural 
value of knowledge-based policy that fails to understand the nature of creativity?  
Similarly, but in the vein of privileging the more prosaic elements of national 
culture, the following document from Hong Kong paints a picture of national self-image, 
not just in strongly instrumental terms, but in purely commercial ones:  
A strong work ethic and spirit of entrepreneurship should continue to be nurtured and 
strengthened… Hong Kong's cosmopolitan outlook and its character as both a Chinese 
and international city are [important elements of strength]. The fact that so many of its 
people have been educated overseas or have lived or travelled abroad, the widespread 
[use] of English and the ease of access Hong Kong people have to information have all 
contributed to making Hong Kong an international city with a distinctive culture… At the 
same time, it is important to ensure that Hong Kong people gain a high level of 
proficiency in the Chinese language… to [leverage] its distinctive blend of Chinese and 
Western cultures to become [an international centre for cultural exchanges] and, in the 
process, to strengthen its position as [a gateway to China]. (hongkvis: 6,805) 
Here, Necessity is directed at the very source of third-order autopoiesis in human 
societies: language. The exhortation is this: ‘Hong Kong people must be proficient at the 
Chinese language’. Apart from anything else, the ‘language ideology’ presented here 
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blatantly ignores the rich and vast linguistic differentiation amongst the people known in 
the ‘occident’ as ‘Chinese’ (Irvine and Gal 2000). The Necessity for Hong Kong people 
to be fluent in ‘Chinese’, an unambiguous exhortation, is premised upon nothing in 
particular and appears from nowhere. Moreover, while it is undoubtedly true that many 
people in Hong Kong are pragmatic and entrepreneurial, and that many of their 
international familial networks are an impressive source of potentially vast benefits, the 
picture painted here is a one-dimensional view of millennia of socio-cultural 
development. Culture is presented as an instrument of commerce, a ‘thing’ destined for 
exchange, and thus as an instrument for the commodification of other cultures. Are none 
of these instrumental values sustained by China’s long intellectual history, its distinctive 
art history, and its other cultural traditions? If they have been sustained by these 
traditions, is the above passage anything more than a superficial and inept social analysis 
informed by technocratic values? We read the statement as an anti-intellectual position, 
poorly disguised as the commodification and technicalisation of ethnolinguistic, 
nationalistic, and economistic sentiment.  
Globalisation of ‘culture’, which is raised in all but the first of the corpus 
documents cited in our analysis, is an issue in need of closer examination. Discourses on 
globalisation and knowledge-based economies closely overlap (Rooney and Mandeville 
1998), but it is instructive to see that technocratic values position culture as an instrument 
of economic globalisation rather than vice versa. Of course, it is not only in Hong Kong 
where this is done. We have seen in the Australian examples above that the products of 
Australian cultural processes are potential keys to ‘new global markets’.  
A more curious position is taken in a French document, which states that:  
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A consensus seems to be emerging at the national and international level on the 
following points: - as the Internet and the networks are a still evolving and highly complex 
world, it is necessary to create a place for the different players to meet and hold 
discussions so as to give thought to subjects of common interest, harmonise practices in 
short [set the rules] for "world civility" and create [a centre of network skills and 
expertise]. No such precinct exists, and the hearings carried out by the Council of State, 
which have clearly confirmed that need, could not replace it on a permanent basis … (fr2: 
81,985) 
Here we see the contradictions of the contemporary technocratic axiology fully blown. 
The exhortation is to set the rules quickly while the Internet and the networks are still 
evolving. The imperative appears to be Jesuitical—‘Control it now before it gets beyond 
our grasp!’. World civility is a function of elite technocratic control rather than an 
intrinsic function of human interrelatedness on a global scale. Many questions arise here. 
Amongst which group of people is this emerging consensus developing? Who are the 
(Important/Significant) different players? Is world civility merely a game for which this 
(obviously small) group of players must set the rules? How is a global phenomenon to be 
situated in a precinct? Precisely how is it connected to networks of skills and expertise, 
and what kinds of skills and expertise might these be? One thing is certain though: the 
authors link world civility to rules, games, and players. The childish poverty of the 
technocratic axiology is exposed here in full. 
If the applied epistemology revealed in the policy documents above appears 
confused, narrow, or simplistic in its view of knowledge and social ontology, then, the 
position adopted in the following Canadian document approaches the Dantesque for its 
less-than-divine comedy: 
The Panel believes there is a need for [closer linkages between the world of business 
and the world of education]. Our discussions with [employers] confirm the view that the 
quality of the [technical skills] and knowledge of Canadian university and college 
graduates is very high. However, as noted earlier, employers often complained that new 
recruits lack [the essential skills needed even for entry-level, let alone more senior 
positions]. This is a clear but difficult challenge to Canadian schools. [Revising curricula] 
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once again, especially with limited resources, may seem daunting. However, in our view, 
this is necessary. Despite recent growth in co-operative education and "experience-with-
work" programs in the elementary, secondary and post-secondary systems, young 
people still have too few opportunities to learn about [the world of work]. Most high school 
students study social, health and family life issues to [prepare them to become 
responsible citizens]. Oddly, however, only a fortunate few learn directly about [the forces 
and factors that will shape their ability to earn a living]. (canada1: 33,034) 
An epistemology that takes such an incoherent, unsophisticated, and uninformed view of 
learning and education is dangerous. Here, Necessity is metaphorically transferred from 
second-hand, non-specific complaints by a nebulous group of employers about the quality 
of graduates to the Necessity of revising the national curriculum, tout court. Technocratic 
values are totalitarian in their grasp if nothing else. Not surprisingly (in the current 
climate) increased government funding for education is not even mentioned. Rather, the 
authors are exhorting the Necessity for education to be education for work.  
There is, of course, no doubt that education and work are linked, indeed, that the 
world of work is highly dependant on the education system (which is also a world of 
work). However, to present a chain of logic stating that: (1) the quality of technical skills 
and knowledge are very high among graduates; (2) that employers complained about a 
lack of essential skills in new recruits; (3) that there is a lack of opportunity to learn about 
the ‘world of work’ because students study social, health and family life; and (4) that 
oddly students do not directly learn of the forces and factors that will shape their ability 
to earn a living makes absolutely no sense. Although there is clearly a convoluted logic at 
work here, there is confusion about what is taken to be at the root of the ‘problem’, and 
the logic relies heavily upon the axiologically nuanced discourses about ‘the real 
world’—while the discourse recognises that other worlds and world-views exist, they are 
entirely devoid of any ‘real’ values. One reading of this passage is that, at its heart, the 
real world rhetoric is being used to justify an argument that the education system should 
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be put in the control of business (who not only understands the ‘real world’, but in fact is 
the only real world) rather than educators, who clearly do not understand ‘the real world’ 
and have consequently got it all wrong. 
Our questions to the authors of this document are: how is learning about social, 
health and family issues not learning about the forces that will shape the ability of 
students to earn a living?; and how is participating in society and family as citizens not 
tantamount to an active, profound, legitimate and direct engagement in important activity 
in the real world? Rhetoric about the real world is not much more than thinly disguised 
anti-intellectualism, and is, therefore, inadequate in a serious applied epistemology for a 
knowledge-based society.  
Whilst the confusion that leads to the epistemic and axiological failure of the 
Canadian document is a problem of very great seriousness in developing coherent 
education policy (which must be a central platform in any knowledge-based society), 
many issues of technicalisation appear in relation to education policy throughout the 
corpus. One such example is evident in the following statement from a Greek policy 
document:  
Greece is currently faced with this challenge, and it can meet it by drawing from its 
heritage in the field of education and science, creating the appropriate circumstances for 
progress and growth within [the framework of a unified Europe]. In this context, [the 
reassessment and redefinition of the education system], taking into consideration the 
progress to date and the way that new technologies may affect it, is a pressing need. A 
primary government responsibility is to ensure equal opportunities in learning for an 
active and equal participation of all citizens in the digital world. (greece1: 11,047) 
Having set up the propositionally-constituted context, the authors transpose ‘factual’ 
content into hortatory imperatives, arguing that:  
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In order to allow both teachers and their students to participate in the Information Society, 
it is necessary to [make them aware of the new technologies and to provide them with 
the necessary basic knowledge and skills]. The teaching of information science and new 
technologies, as well as the familiarisation of students with [the use of electronic and 
audio-visual and communication media], should be core subjects in all education levels. 
Only by doing so will the equal participation in tomorrow's digital economic and social 
developments be secured. (greece1: 11,047) 
The hortatory displacement moves from the esteemed Greek intellectual heritage, to new 
geopolitical contexts, to a redefinition of the entire Greek educational system, to finally 
posit the Necessity and Desirability of educating students in new technologies (which will 
in any case be defunct by the following year) and the digital world. It is a rather rapid and 
impoverishing descent. 
 While there is of course some merit to the argument that technological education 
should be central to contemporary education systems, should it displace scholarship in 
language, social studies, philosophy, physics, or literature? Such issues are not broached 
anywhere in the entire document. Neither is the issue of securing what is termed social 
developments adequately addressed. For example, what is the link between technology, 
digitalisation and social development? What is the link between social development and 
technical education? We are left to wonder. Perhaps the authors assume that simply 
plugging in some recently acquired technology will take care of all these issues. Other 
disturbing, but common, difficulties emerge in another passage from the Greek 
document.  
It is envisaged that by solving the problem of lack of classrooms and eliminating double 
shifts in schools, the necessary infrastructure will be established in each school allowing 
students to practice, in their free time, in [using the new technologies]… Local 
government and the local community in general (scientific associations, private 
companies, Chambers, etc.) can make a valuable contribution in this process by creating 
suitably equipped areas and making them available to young people… It is necessary to 
create both the human and the physical networks that will [exploit the existing 
infrastructures in the academic and private sector] (GU-NET, EDET, TEN-34/135, 
Internet providers). The development of digital and cable television also create [sic] a 
great potential for [the provision of information and educational services]. The [production 
and marketing of books and educational software for each subject] will further ensure a 
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pluralistic provision of knowledge to students. The target is for every school, every 
teacher and every student to have access to such educational networks by 2002. 
(greece1: 12,094) 
Here we see the cargo cult of techno-utopianism writ large, along with the student-as-
knowledge-bucket view of education. Information technology will apparently provide a 
magic carpet that will carry the people of Greece away from the negative effects of a 
severe under-investment in the education system. The authors choose, instead, to posit 
the Necessity of committing social, financial, and educational resources to a suite of 
technologies that have yet to show any broadly significant benefits, and which are 
destined for fast obsolescence, along with their associated skills. The Greek document is 
exemplary of a bankrupt technocratic axiology that pervades public policy discourses 
about the commercialisation of epistemology, privileging the ‘things’ of technology over 
the cultivation of critical thinking skills. This passage is again representative of an anti-
intellectualism that is particularly unacceptable in education policy, but even more so in 
any knowledge-related policy. Such a stance towards policy is rendered all the less 
acceptable because it clearly originates in an almost complete lack of interest in treating 
issues of education, knowledge, wisdom, and ‘sociality’ (Silverstone 1999) with the 
seriousness they clearly deserve. The knowledge environment—the social source of 
knowing—is abandoned in favour of the latest gleaming, clicking, whirring lump of 
plastic and silicon.  
A few parting words 
It is evident that the extent to which third-order autopoietic systems are situated, 
processual, relational and sociocognitive is clearly not understood by the various authors 
of our corpus. Knowledge is treated as an independent, objective substance, a mere object 
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for a commercially motivated instrumentalism. At the same time, it is victimised by an 
intrinsically anti-intellectual, technocratic axiology. That axiology, from which the 
authorial stance of the policy makers derives its impetus, thoroughly pervades the corpus. 
The high levels of instrumentalism, anti-intellectualism, and the lack of desire to deal 
with ‘non instrumental’ human values on their own terms has left unasked and invisible 
the following questions: to what extent is commercialisation of epistemology possible 
without destroying social systems outright?; and, what is the wisdom in anti-intellectual 
knowledge-related public policy?  
 Our analysis clearly shows that Fuller's (1995) argument about the infusion of 
industrial values is a world-wide reality in knowledge economy policy. According to 
what we can see in our corpus, we could also add that the knowledge-related policy 
discourse community seeks to intensify the commodification of knowledge societies by 
deploying technocratic axiologies, which are overlaid upon the broader and older 
axiologies of a senile industrialism. Technocratic axiologies (produced by the self-
proclaimed pillars of knowledge societies) seem unable to grasp life as it is lived. Thus, 
the policy positions betoken a seriously distorted grasp of what it means to be human and 
what it is to know. Our position is that technocratic social epistemology, as evidenced by 
the corpus, is insufficient and (at least potentially) quite dangerous because policy makers 
understand it in mechanistic rather than autopoietic terms, leading them to prescribe their 
deficient axiological imperatives for the whole of humanity.  
Our perspective and analysis suggests that any fracture between instrumental and 
non-instrumental aspects of human ‘sociality’ creates a false dichotomy and a deficient, 
regressive, and damaging basis for fostering the intellectual life of people. We see a 
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profoundly asocial, indeed, anti social view of the human world, one that is, therefore, at 
odds with the social reality of what it means to know (a process intrinsic to and definitive 
of social coherence). To simply aim at commercialising ‘knowledge’ is to miss the point 
of making public policy—that is, to create societies which are environments for 
providing better lives for people, lives that are more rewarding and more enjoyable. It 
misses the point because these ‘things’ are all, first and foremost, socially, culturally, 
spiritually and artistically derived processes of well being.  
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